For a long time, turning on six-digit authenticator codes or Microsoft Authenticator push prompts with Number Matching was enough to check the MFA box in Microsoft 365. Against automated credential stuffing, those methods still hold up reasonably well. Against targeted Business Email Compromise (BEC), however, standard MFA is no longer sufficient on its own.

Why do push approvals and six-digit TOTP codes keep failing even when employees try to be careful? Commodity Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) toolkits such as Evilginx and Tycoon 2FA stand up a live TLS reverse proxy on a lookalike domain and relay Microsoft's real login.microsoftonline.com sign-in flow in real time. The user types their real password, approves the real two-digit Number Match prompt on their phone, and Entra ID issues valid ESTSAUTH and ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT session cookies—right back through the attacker's proxy.

Maybe the problem isn't so much that someone missed a typo in a phishing URL, but rather that neither TOTP nor push MFA checks which domain the browser is actually talking to? That is the gap WebAuthn / FIDO2 credentials and certificate-based authentication (CBA) close. Instead of passing a shared secret over the wire, the browser and hardware authenticator sign a challenge tied directly to Microsoft's verified Relying Party ID (login.microsoft.com). Put a reverse proxy in between on any other domain, and the authenticator simply refuses to sign.

Which MFA Methods Count as Phishing-Resistant in Entra ID

Microsoft Entra ID ships with a built-in Conditional Access Authentication Strength named Phishing-resistant MFA. Three practical options satisfy that policy without forcing your team to run a legacy X.509 smartcard PKI:

Authentication Method Cryptographic Mechanism Meets Entra Phishing-Resistant Strength? Operational Fit
SMS, voice, TOTP, or push Number Matching Shared secret or out-of-band approval unbound to browser TLS origin No (interceptable via AiTM reverse proxies) Legacy fallback to phase out; unsuitable for admins, finance wire approvers, or regulated scopes
FIDO2 hardware security keys (YubiKey 5, Token2) Hardware-bound ECDSA/Ed25519 private key tied to rpId = login.microsoft.com + local PIN Yes Break-glass accounts, Global/Privileged Admins, shared floor workstations, CMMC Level 2 enclaves
Device-bound passkeys in Microsoft Authenticator (iOS / Android) WebAuthn key stored in mobile Secure Enclave / Titan hardware with Bluetooth proximity check (CTAP2) Yes Company-wide mobile and remote workforce rollout without mailing USB keys to every employee
Windows Hello for Business / macOS Platform SSO TPM 2.0 or Apple Secure Enclave asymmetric key bound to an Entra-joined corporate computer Yes Low-friction daily workstation login on Intune- or Jamf-managed corporate laptops

Set Up FIDO2 Break-Glass Accounts Before Touching Conditional Access

Do not enforce Authentication Strengths in Conditional Access until two cloud-only emergency access ("break-glass") accounts are tested, locked in separate safes, and excluded from your policies. Because Microsoft enforces MFA across administrative portals, older password-only break-glass runbooks no longer work when you actually need them. Register physical FIDO2 keys on both emergency accounts first:

  1. Create two cloud-only accounts on your root *.onmicrosoft.com domain (such as bg-admin-01@tenant.onmicrosoft.com and bg-admin-02@tenant.onmicrosoft.com) so a broken Entra Connect sync, an expired federation certificate, or a custom-domain DNS mistake cannot lock you out during an outage.
  2. Register at least two distinct physical FIDO2 security keys on each account and lock them in separate fireproof safes held by two different company officers.
  3. Set up an Azure Monitor and Log Analytics alert rule that pages security leadership within 60 seconds whenever either break-glass ObjectId shows up in SignInLogs or AuditLogs, and test both keys every quarter.

Enforce Passkey Attestation and Onboard Remote Staff With TAP

Left on default settings, passkey registration can let consumer password managers store and sync passkeys inside personal cloud accounts outside company control. In Entra Admin Center under Protection → Authentication methods → Passkey (FIDO2), turn on attestation and restrict enrollment to approved enterprise Authenticator Attestation GUIDs (AAGUIDs):

# Configure Entra ID FIDO2 / Passkey policy via Microsoft Graph PowerShell
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Policy.ReadWrite.AuthenticationMethod"

$Fido2Params = @{
    IsSelfServiceRegistrationAllowed = $true
    IsAttestationEnforced            = $true
    KeyRestrictions                  = @{
        IsEnforced      = $true
        EnforcementType = "allow"
        AaGuids         = @(
            "de1e552d-db1d-4423-a619-566b625cdc84", # Microsoft Authenticator Passkey (iOS)
            "ce53f961-37a7-4114-bd8b-f32693a930ac", # Microsoft Authenticator Passkey (Android)
            "2fc0579f-8113-47ea-b116-bb5a8db9202a", # YubiKey 5 Series (NFC / USB-C)
            "ee882879-721c-4913-9775-3dfcce97072a"  # YubiKey 5 Series firmware variant
        )
    }
}
# Always verify exact AAGUIDs from your hardware vendor firmware bulletins and test sign-in logs before enforcing!
Update-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicyAuthenticationMethodConfiguration `
    -AuthenticationMethodConfigurationId "Fido2" `
    -BodyParameter $Fido2Params

How do you get a remote new hire enrolled on day one without leaving SMS or password-only login turned on during onboarding? Issue a single-use Temporary Access Pass (TAP, with IsUsableOnce = true and a 60-minute lifetime) over a verified IT onboarding call so the employee sets up Windows Hello or Platform SSO alongside their Authenticator passkey right away.

Roll Out Policies in Stages Before Retiring Legacy Factors

Run every new Conditional Access policy in Report-only mode for five to seven business days before turning enforcement on. Almost every tenant has an old CLI script, an interactive service account nobody documented, or a legacy line-of-business mobile app that cannot render a WebAuthn prompt, and spotting those in sign-in logs is much calmer than locking out a shift.

Start in week one with directory and cloud administrators (Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Exchange Administrator, Security Administrator, Conditional Access Administrator, Intune Administrator, and SharePoint Administrator), setting Grant → Require authentication strength → Phishing-resistant MFA and excluding only your two FIDO2 break-glass accounts. Over weeks two and three, bring in finance, executives, legal, and HR—getting managed laptops onto Windows Hello for Business or macOS Platform SSO (Secure Enclave key storage) plus an Authenticator passkey on each person's phone as a backup factor before flipping their policy from Report-only to On.

Across weeks four through six, expand phishing-resistant Authentication Strength to All cloud apps for the broader workforce and contractors. Once everyone is moved over, turn off SMS, voice calls, and TOTP registration inside the Authentication Methods policy. Leaving older methods enabled as "just in case" fallbacks defeats much of the work, since an attacker only needs a login prompt to fall back to the weakest factor still allowed on the account.

Where WebAuthn Alone Stops Short: Device Compliance and Token Protection

Is FIDO2 the end of session theft? At the login screen, yes: Evilginx cannot replay a WebAuthn assertion across domains. What WebAuthn alone does not stop is post-login infostealer malware sitting on an unmanaged home PC, waiting for the user to sign in legitimately so it can lift session cookies or refresh tokens out of local disk and memory.

Two companion controls in Conditional Access close most of that gap. The first is requiring Intune-compliant or hybrid-joined endpoints for Microsoft 365, ERP, and source-code access, which keeps Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT) protected inside TPM 2.0 hardware rather than exposed to user-mode credential dumping. The second is turning on Conditional Access Token Protection (Require token protection for sign-in sessions) across supported Windows native broker (WAM), Exchange Online, SharePoint Online, and Teams desktop flows so issued tokens are bound via Proof-of-Possession to that machine's TPM key.

# Audit recent Entra interactive sign-ins to confirm privileged users no longer authenticate via phishable methods
Get-MgAuditLogSignIn -Top 500 -Filter "conditionalAccessStatus eq 'success'" |
    Where-Object { $_.AuthenticationRequirement -eq "multiFactorAuthentication" } |
    Select-Object CreatedDateTime,UserPrincipalName,AppDisplayName,
        @{N="AuthMethods";E={ ($_.AuthenticationDetails.AuthenticationMethod) -join "," }} |
    Export-Csv -NoTypeInformation "./entra-mfa-method-audit.csv"

Hardware-backed WebAuthn satisfies NIST SP 800-63B phishing-resistant authenticator guidance, PCI DSS v4.0.1 Requirement 8.4/8.5 anti-replay goals, CMMC 2.0 Level 2 (IA.L2-3.5.3), and modern cyber-insurance underwriting checks. If your team wants a hand setting up Entra Conditional Access stages without locking users out, take a look at our email and identity security, managed IT services, and CMMC and GovCon IT support pages, and keep our Microsoft 365 compromised account checklist handy in your incident runbook.