DMARC Record & Staged Rollout Builder
Draft DMARC TXT records, DKIM and SPF alignment flags, external report authorization records, and dig verification commands.
What This Builder Generates
Jumping straight to p=reject on a production domain is a quick way to block your own invoicing or help-desk emails. Enter your sending domain, policy stage (none, quarantine, or reject), subdomain policy (sp=), DKIM and SPF alignment modes (relaxed or strict), and reporting mailboxes (rua= and ruf=) to validate tag syntax locally, build the _dmarc TXT value, draft cross-domain _report._dmarc records, and copy dig verification commands.
Everything here runs offline in your browser. The builder does not query live DNS, construct v=spf1 strings, or count recursive SPF lookups—so check your live SPF record and DKIM selectors with the generated dig commands before tightening enforcement.
Stepping Safely Toward Enforcement
Start at p=none with aggregate reporting enabled. Give yourself enough mail history to spot every real sender—Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, payroll, CRM, ticketing, and transactional APIs—then fix DKIM signing and Return-Path alignment before stepping through quarantine to p=reject.
Example Monitoring Record
To start discovery on example.org while routing aggregate XML reports to an analyzer mailbox at dmarc-rua@example.net, publish v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-rua@example.net at _dmarc.example.org. Because the report mailbox sits under a different domain, confirm that example.org._report._dmarc.example.net also publishes v=DMARC1 or receivers will quietly drop external reports.
Related Guides and Services
Frequently Asked Questions
Why should we avoid relying on pct= partial enforcement as a safety net?
Under RFC 7489, mail receivers apply sampling unevenly when messages are quarantined rather than rejected, and the IETF DMARCbis revision deprecates pct= altogether. Stepping cleanly from p=none to p=quarantine and then p=reject after verifying DKIM and SPF alignment is much more predictable.
What does the sp= subdomain tag control?
When sp= is omitted, any subdomain without its own DMARC record inherits the root policy (p=). Once you know which subdomains legitimately send mail, setting sp=reject stops attackers from spoofing nonexistent addresses like payroll.example.org even while the root domain is still in monitoring.
How do we stay under RFC 7208's 10-DNS-lookup SPF limit?
Piling every SaaS vendor's include: mechanism onto your root domain eventually trips the 10-lookup ceiling and causes SPF permerror failures. Moving marketing, billing, and support senders onto dedicated subdomains (such as updates.example.org or billing.example.org) gives each mail stream its own isolated SPF budget and DKIM keys.